Recently, the current interim government of Bangladesh appointed Advocate Tajul Islam as the Chief Prosecutor for the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT), despite his previous role in defending several Jamaat-e-Islami leaders in cases before the tribunal. His appointment has raised eyebrows, although few have openly objected. This decision raises both judicial and political concerns . It seems the government has failed to learn from the mistakes of the previous administration and their public relations blunders. In fact, the appointment feels like a gift to the very regime the people just deposed.

The Awami League (AL) government previously mishandled the war crimes tribunal process by making controversial decisions, including certain appointments. Although the people of Bangladesh may feel they received the justice they deserved, the process itself was fraught with controversy, for which the AL government was largely responsible. Now, the interim government seems poised to repeat those same mistakes by appointing Tajul Islam, a figure closely associated with defending those accused of war crimes, as the chief prosecutor.

From a political standpoint, Tajul Islam’s appointment appears advantageous for the AL. Tajul, having defended several Jamaat-e-Islami leaders and been a member of the AB Party, a breakaway faction of Jamaat, creates a connection that undermines the legitimacy of the tribunal. For years, the AL has argued that if they were not in power, Jamaat—a party still marred by its 1971 role—would rise again. Despite Jamaat’s diminished standing, the memory of 1971 still resonates deeply with the people of Bangladesh. Once the dust settles, Tajul Islam’s previous role as a defender of Jamaat leaders will likely provoke intense public debate, potentially bolstering the AL’s narrative of being the only party capable of preventing a resurgence of Jamaat influence.

As December nears, a month of significant historical reflection on Bangladesh’s independence, questions about Jamaat’s role during 1971 and Tajul Islam’s suitability as chief prosecutor will become more pressing. The appointment could unintentionally rekindle sympathies for the AL by reminding the public of Jamaat’s dark history during the Liberation War.

Moreover, there are already murmurs about who truly controls the interim government, with some suggesting that key positions are being handed to individuals sympathetic to Jamaat, even if they aren’t officially party members. Tajul Islam’s appointment only lends credence to such claims. Over time, these allegations will likely damage the credibility of the interim government, particularly given the sensitive nature of Jamaat’s role in 1971. This is a risk the interim government cannot afford, especially in the long term.

Third, and most crucially, his appointment could hinder Bangladesh’s ability to bring Hasina back and prosecute her. The code of conduct for lawyers, as promulgated by the Bangladesh Bar Council, is outdated and lacks the robustness found in many first-world countries. During and after the trial, Tajul Islam reportedly made comments that, if made in a first-world jurisdiction, would likely have triggered disciplinary proceedings by the Bar Council, as they would have violated professional standards. Some of these remarks were also directed against Hasina and her government in various forums. In fact, Tajul Islam was censured and warned by the ICT itself while representing Jamaat leaders, though the Bar Council took no action against him. Given this history, having Tajul Islam prosecute Hasina creates problematic optics. Her defense could easily argue that his prior conduct amounts to prosecutorial misconduct, undermining her chances of a fair trial with him as the prosecutor.

To understand the gravity of this situation, we can look at the trial of Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet in the UK. When Pinochet was arrested on an international warrant in 1998, the House of Lords initially ruled he could be prosecuted. However, the decision was later quashed because Lord Hoffman, a judge in the case, failed to disclose his connections with Amnesty International, which was involved in the proceedings. As Lord Hewart famously stated, “Justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.” In Pinochet’s case, the mere suspicion of bias was enough to overturn a major ruling. Similarly, by appointing Tajul Islam, the Bangladeshi government has created an appearance of prosecutorial bias that could jeopardize any case against Hasina. This would not help Bangladesh in any foreign court (assuming that there will be an extradition hearing) and foreign press.

Whoever appointed Tajul Islam may have recognized the irony in selecting the former defense counsel for Jamaat leaders as the Chief Prosecutor tasked with prosecuting Hasina, the daughter of Sheikh Mujib, the hero of 1971. However, if Hasina were to successfully argue and win her case against extradition (a hypothetical scenario) by alleging bias and prosecutorial misconduct—much like Tajul Islam did when defending Jamaat leaders before the ICT—it would bring the situation full circle in a deeply ironic way.

This is not to suggest that Tajul Islam is not qualified or biased. However, even if Tajul Islam is the most qualified candidate, his appointment is ill-advised given the circumstances. Prosecuting any political leader is already an immensely challenging task, and this appointment only adds unnecessary complications. The interim government of Bangladesh should have anticipated these concerns and avoided creating the perception of bias in such a sensitive case.